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CLAIM PRECLUSION AND REFORMATION
OF CONTRACTS: NEW YORK CPLR 3002(d)
BERNARD E. GEGAN*
In 1939, the New York Legislature accepted a recommendation of the Law Revision Commission' and enacted what is now
CPLR 3002(d): "A judgment denying recovery in an action upon
an agreement in writing shall not be deemed to bar an action to
reform such agreement and to enforce it as reformed."2 The purpose of this article is to critique this statute and urge its repeal.
Before addressing the statute, however, it seems fair to tell the
other side of the story through an illustration of an unfortunate
case decided before the statute was enacted, and for which it
would have afforded relief.
In Kwiatkowski v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen,3 a
woman insured her life for $5,000 with a fraternal benefit society. The written application, attached to the membership certificate when it was delivered, warranted the truth of all statements and provided that any untrue statement would render the
certificate void.4 She died almost two years later, and the society
denied liability because the word "three" was written in answer
to a printed question on the application form asking the number
of her children; whereas the undisputed evidence showed that
she had seven.5
* Whitney Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. B.S. 1959,
LLB. 1961, St. John's University; LL.M. 1962, Harvard University. The author
wishes to thank Terence O'Brien for his valuable research assistance. Thanks also
go to the author's colleagues Vincent Alexander, Edward Cavanagh, Steven McSloy
and Robert Parella for commenting on an earlier draft of this article.
'NEwYORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT 205-99 (1939).
2 1939 N.Y. Laws ch. 128; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 112-d (1939). When the CPLR

replaced the Civil Practice Act in 1963, former section 112-d was transferred unchanged to CPLR 3002(d). The background and origin of this statute and companion
statutes is presented in 3 JACK WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE

3002.09 (1996).
153 N.E. 847 (N.Y. 1926).
Id. at 847.
' Kwiatkowski v. Brotherhood of Am. Yeomen, 216 N.Y.S. 102, 103 (4th Dep't
1926), rev'd, 153 N.E. 847 (N.Y. 1926); see also Emanuele v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
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At the trial before a jury, witnesses for the plaintiff beneficiaries testified that as a Polish immigrant the deceased could neither read nor speak English; that the questions were put to her
verbally by the insurer's medical examiner in Polish; that he
never asked how many children she had; that all the answers in
the application were written by the examiner; that the deceased
could not read the completed application and signed it with her
mark; and that after the certificate and attached application
were delivered, she put them away without further inquiry! The
report does not indicate whether the defendant introduced any
contradictory evidence.
The plaintiffs argued that the defendant was estopped from
claiming that the false answer was the deceased's act. Both
sides moved for a directed verdict, and the trial judge thereupon
directed a verdict for the plaintiffs
On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment by
a 3-2 vote.' The majority analyzed prior New York Court of Appeals cases holding that an insured was bound to read the questions and answers set forth in the application if it was physically
annexed to the policy and returned to the insured These cases
held that a failure to read the papers deprived the insured of any
equitable claim of estoppel against the insurance company." The
majority nevertheless concluded that the precedents left room to
Co., 242 N.Y.S. 715, 717 (N.Y.C. City Ct. Kings County 1930) (noting insured failed
to indicate in policy application previous surgery and consultations with physician).
6 Kwiatkowski, 153 N.E. at 847; see also Emanuele, 242 N.Y.S.
at 717
(submitting that assured was illiterate and had application read to him).
7 Kwiatkowski, 216 N.Y.S. at 103.
8 Id. at 108 (Sears, J., dissenting) (stating section 58 of Insurance Law has no
application to contracts of fraternal benefit organizations).
9 Id. at 104-07; see Stanulevich v. St. Lawrence Life Ass'n, 127 N.E. 315, 315
(N.Y. 1920) ("[Tihe application being a part of the policy, the insured and assured
are bound by its terms ... ."); Bollard v. New York Life Ins. Co., 162 N.Y.S. 706, 710
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1917) ("The policy and the papers so delivered are the
whole contract."), affd, 168 N.Y.S. 1102 (1st Dep't 1918), affd, 126 N.E. 900 (N.Y.
1920); cf Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 62 N.E. 763, 766-67 (N.Y. 1902)
(estopping insurer from using defense of fraud or breach of warranty where answers
to questions incorporated in policy were not written down or delivered with policy).
10 Kwiatkowski, 216 N.Y.S. at 104-06; see also Carmichael v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 101 N.Y.S. 602, 604 (1st Dep't 1906) (noting that plaintiff would have
noticed false answers had he read policy); Hook v. Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90
N.Y.S. 56, 60 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1904) (recognizing duty of party to contract to
acquaint herself with its contents). But see Emanuele, 242 N.Y.S. at 719 ("A grave
injustice results where the application is delivered written in the English language
to an insured who neither reads nor writes English .... ").
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take account of the circumstances of particular cases and held
that the facts before the court justified an estoppel against forfeiture of the coverage for breach of warranty."
On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the judgment
was unanimously reversed and the complaint dismissed.' The
court explained that the defendant had done nothing to deter the
deceased from having the written contract read over and explained to her and that her choice not to do so afforded no
ground for distinguishing the earlier cases denying estoppel." Of
particular relevance to the subject of this study the court observed:
If the plaintiffs were seeking a reformation of the contract made
by the applicant, through whom they claim, evidence that the
answers contained in the written statement were never given
and that the defendant, through its agents, have taken unfair
advantage of her disability to read English, might be relevant.
We do not pass upon such question now. In the present case the
plaintiffs are suing upon a contract and under its terms are not
entitled to a recovery.14
The suggestion that the evidence might justify a recovery on
a different theory was cold comfort given the court's disposition
of the appeal: complaint dismissed. At the time this case was
decided, the final judgment against the plaintiffs was res judicata; therefore, no second action for reformation would lie. 5 If
the statute under examination had been in force at the time of
the Kwiatkowski case, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to
have their reformation claim heard on the merits and might
have obtained the substance of justice and not just its shadow.

" Kwiatkowski, 216 N.Y.S. at 108; see also Davern v. American Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 150 N.E. 129, 130-32 (N.Y. 1925) (analyzing whether policy rider was part of
same insurance contract and therefore subject to same application).
' Kwiatkowski, 153 N.E. at 847.
"Id.; see also Emanuele, 242 N.Y.S. at 718 (noting that no act of insurer hindered applicant from learning contents of policy).
"4Kwiatkowski, 153 N.E. at 847; see also Emanuele, 242 N.Y.S. at 719
(concluding that although not constituting fraud, false answers on application
barred recovery by insured).
' Steinbach v. Relief Fire Ins. Co., 77 N.Y. 498, 502 (1879) (holding doctrine of
res judicata must apply, "unless plain principles of law, which have always been regarded as important in the administration of justice, are disregarded."); see also
Washburn v. Great W. Ins. Co., 114 Mass. 175, 176 (1873) (holding action at law bar
to action in equity).
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LAW, EQuITY AND RES JUDICATA

The subject of this article is whether an action in equity for
reformation should be permitted after an unsuccessful attempt
to enforce a written contract has gone to final judgment. This is
only one part of the larger question of when litigation over the
same matter must come to an end. The question is most acute
when the reason for asking for a second chance arises because of
some circumstance not reasonably ascertainable in the first case.
The value the law places on finality is manifest when it denies a
paralyzed accident victim access to any additional legal remedy
after a final judgment awarding a modest sum based on apparently minor injuries. 16
Sometimes the plea for a second chance arises because the
lawyers and judges bungled the handling of the first case. It is
similar to undergoing a second operation because the surgeon
mistakenly left a sponge in the patient's body during the first
operation. 7 It might be even more frustrating if the problem is
caused by the surgeon's deliberate choice. Imagine how a patient
feels if she is told that she needs a second operation for repair of
an aneurysm. The surgeon says: "I saw the aneurysm, but that
wasn't why I operated the first time. I operated because I
thought you had a tumor. The surgery disclosed an aneurysm,
not a tumor. However, we do not do operate on aneurysms during tumor operations." If that were the surgeon's position, it is
doubtful if society would even be content with the solution that
the patient can always undergo a second operation. The cry
would be to fix the system and change the surgeon's attitude.
Before the merger of law and equity in the mid-nineteenth
century, a litigant like Ms. Kwiatkowski was in very much the
same position as the patient suffering from either an aneurysm
1'6Fetter

v. Beale, 11, 91 Eng. Rep. 1122, 1122 (MB. 1697) (holding plaintiffs
recovery in first action bars action for subsequent loss resulting from same injury);
Whitney v. Clarendon, 18 Vt. 251, 251 (1846) (noting that recovery for loss of son's
services bars recovery for continued loss in subsequent suit); 2 A.C. FREEMAN, LAW
OF JUDGMENTS § 599 (5th ed. 1925) (stating "[u]nforseen and improbable injuries
resulting from any act are, equally with existing and probable injuries, parts of an
inseverable demand."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 18, illus. 1 (1980).

" Here, too, the law, unlike medicine, denies a second chance. The Restatement's position is that the finality of judgment is not impeached because of error.
The sole remedy of the party adversely affected is to take steps to set aside or reverse the erroneous judgment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 cmt. b.
& illus. 2; id. § 19 cmt. a. (1980); 2 FREEMAN, supra note 16, §§ 553 (fraud), 628
(mistake), and 727 (legal error).
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or a tumor, and the common law court was like the surgeon with
the one-track mind. Of course, there was one difference: the
plaintiff, unlike the patient, made the initial diagnosis. However, the line dividing the subject matter jurisdiction of the
common-law court from that of chancery was sometimes a fine
one, and misdiagnoses were common. 8 Depending on how the
evidence developed, a bill in equity might be dismissed because
the Chancellor found the legal remedy adequate. On the other
hand, an action at law might fail because critical evidence was
inadmissible before a jury because of the statute of frauds or the
parol evidence rule. Either way, if such were found to be the
case, the unsuccessful plaintiff was permitted a second chance to
seek the proper form of relief in the proper forum 9 for much the
same reason that the unhappy patient underwent a second operation to repair the aneurysm: it was a poor solution, but given
the system it was better than the alternative.

'8

It was "difficult, and perhaps impossible" said Justice Field, to find "any gen-

eral rule which would determine, in all cases, what should be deemed a suit in equity as distinguished from an action at law ... ." Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S.
146, 151 (1891); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25, cmt. i. (1980)
(noting when plaintiffs had to choose between an action at law or equity, "the choice
could be difficult, as the dividing line was not exact."); see also Forstmann v. Joray
Holding Co., 154 N.E. 652, 654 (N.Y. 1926) ("The fact that the remedy is exclusively
in equity does not compel the court to do inequity. Equity does not aid doubtful
rights."). Uncertainty did not end with merger. See Russell P. Duncan, Note, Law
and Equity in New York - Still Unmerged, 55 YALE L.J. 826, 826 (1946) (noting that
although law and equity were merged in New York with Field Code, lawyers and
judges continued to distinguish between both which created confusion and needless
multiplicity of suits).
'9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25, cmt. i. (1980). An adverse
judgment at law did not merge a plaintiffs claim to an equitable remedy arising
from the same transaction. 2 FREEMAN, supra note 16, § 647. Nor did a prior failure
to obtain equitable relief bar a subsequent action at law. Id. § 646. If, however, an
issue common to both cases had been litigated and determined in the earlier proceeding, it was the subject of collateral estoppel in a second proceeding. Id. § 643.
See Willamsburgh Sav. Bank v. Town of Solon, 32 N.E. 1058, 1062 (N.Y. 1893)
(holding town's action brought in equity which resulted in finding that town's bank
board was valid estopped town from later claiming that bonds were invalid in later
action at law); Tuska v. O'Brien, 68 N.Y. 446, 449-50 (1877) (holding action brought
by property owner was res judicata as to property title for purposes of subsequent
bankruptcy sale). Much the same rule applied within the common law court system
where the wrong form of action was unsuccessfully sought. 2 FREEMAN, supra note
16, § 735; see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1, 3 (1980)
(discussing effects of judicial judgment).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:539

II. FINALITY OF JUDGMENT UNDER CODE PRACTICE

The New York constitution of 1846 abolished the separate
courts of common law and equity,"° and the 1848 Code of Procedure (the Field Code) did away with the ancient common-law
forms of action. Thenceforth there was to be but a single forum
and a single 2vehicle for redress of private wrongs, known as a
"civil action." Within the unified civil action, all claims arising
from the same transaction could be joined, whether those claims
were formerly denominated legal or equitable.2 Further, against
such claims the defendant was permitted to interpose all defenses, likewise whether formerly denominated legal or equitable.2
With respect to the basic type of res judicata, now called
claim preclusion, the defendant was given no choice. According
to the post-code cases, he was required to interpose any defense
he had; otherwise it was forever barred by a judgment against
him.24 As to the plaintiff, the new system was not so clear. Al20 N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. 6, § 3 (1846). Article vi, § 3 specifically provides,
"There shall be a Supreme Court having general jurisdiction in law and equity." By
its provisions, the Constitution of 1846 abolished the court of chancery and its jurisdiction, and its powers were delegated to the Supreme Court. WILLIAM F. WALSH,
A TREATISE ON EQUITY §7, at 37 n.5 (1930).
2'N.Y. CODE OF PROC. § 69 (1852) The Code provided as follows:
The distinction between actions at law, and suits in equity, and the forms
of all such actions and suits, heretofore existing, are abolished; and there
shall be in this State hereafter but one form of action for the enforcement
or protection of private rights and the redress of private wrongs, which
shall be denominated a civil action.
Id. § 69. Between 1849 and 1852, the Field Code was amended and new sections
were added. In consequence, the sections of the code as originally enacted in 1848
were renumbered. For example, section 69 above was originally section 62. Since the
cases almost invariably use the renumbered 1852 version of the code, this article
will cite to that version.
Id, § 167 (1852); see generally Charles E. Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1925) (discussing history and effects of uniting law and
equity under Code of Procedure).
. CODE OF PROC. §150. The 1952 amendments removed all questions as to the
type of defense defendants could raise by providing that "[tlhe defendant may set
forth by answer, as many defences and counter-claims as he may have, whether
they be such as have been heretofore denominated legal or equitable, or both." Id.
"Id.; see Mandeville v. Reynolds, 68 N.Y. 528, 545 (1877) ("The intent of the
Code [of Procedure] is clear, that all controversies respecting the matter involved in
litigation, shall be determined in one action."); Winfield v. Bacon, 24 Barb. 154, 16061 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 1857) ("[Tlhe court has received, in the [Clode [of
Procedure], such a grant of power as to be able to dispose of the whole controversy,
and do complete justice between the parties."); Hinman v. Judson, 13 Barb. 629, 630
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. Cortland County 1852) ("[B]y the Code [of Procedure], the de-
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though the Field Code abolished the old forms of action and
made equitable rights litigable with legal ones, the old patterns
necessarily continued their hold on the minds of lawyers who
still needed some coherent and structured framework with which
to evaluate the legal significance of groupings of facts.25 The new
code was designed to change the machinery of justice, not its
substantive content.26
The Field Code thus laid down no rule on the topic of claim
preclusion. That such a doctrine was necessary was obvious if
the legal system were to work as intended. Otherwise, not only
would litigants be harassed, but new disputes entering the system could never be reached if old ones were endlessly relitigated. The courts were left to define the scope of the "claim"
adjudicated in one judgment in relation to the "claim" presented
in a second action, whether brought by the same plaintiff against
the same defendant or vice versa. Absent identity of claims or
causes of action, the second case could proceed subject to a more
limited type of res judicata traditionally called collateral estoppel
by judgment, now called issue preclusion. Under this rule, even
where the causes of action were different, preclusion applied to a
particular issue within the cause if such issue were common to
both actions and had been litigated and determined in an earlier
action.
With respect to the distinction between legal and equitable
fendant can avail himself of any equitable defense which was formerly available in
chancery ... ."); Auburn City Bank v. Leonard, 20 How. Pr. 193, 197 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Spec. T. Monroe County 1860) ("Parties must assert their rights, whether legal or
equitable, at the first opportunity."); The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
specifically provides that, "[in an action upon the judgment, the defendant cannot
avail himself of defenses he might have interposed, or did interpose, in the first action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18(2) (1980); see also id. § 18(2), illus. 4.
25"The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves."
F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 296 (1909). "Thus, despite introduction of the concept of the single form of action in the Field Code, the courts
persisted in defining 'cause of action' for res judicata purposes in terms of the common law forms of action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introduction ch.
1, 6 (1980).
2' First Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings 87 (Albany
1848). "The [C]ode [of Procedure] makes no change in the substantive rules of the
common law or equity, nor does it change the character and quality of the relief
given." WALSH, supra note 20, § 7, at 37.
FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE

§§ 11.3, 11.7-.8 (claim preclu-

sion), 11.16-.20 (issue preclusion) (1992); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS §§ 20, 24-28 (1980).
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remedies, the New York courts recognized that the benefits of
the merged system would be largely dissipated if a narrow or
formal definition of a cause of action were predicated on the lawequity distinction. For example, according to Hahl v. Sugo," if a
structure maintained by a defendant encroached on a plaintiffs
land, the plaintiff could unite a request for equitable relief in the
form of a mandatory injunction addressed to the defendant together with a request for legal relief, formerly known as ejectment, requiring the sheriff to remove the offending structure and
restore the plaintiffs possession.29 If a judgment awarding exclusively legal relief became final, all of the plaintiffs rights and
remedies with respect to that encroachment were merged into
the final judgment."° Even if that judgment proved ineffectual
because of the sheriffs inaction, the plaintiff was precluded from
bringing a second action seeking equitable relief. 1
The court's determination to give the merger of law and equity its fullest effect in the claim preclusion context came at the
cost of some hardship to the plaintiff victimized by the encroachment. By holding that he could not split legal and equitable relief into two successive actions, the court compelled him
to anticipate in his original action the potential necessity of equitable relief caused by a circumstance arising after judgment the sheriffs inability or unwillingness to tear down and remove
the encroaching structure.32
A substantially lesser hardship would occur where the need
to supplement or supersede a claim for legal relief with equitable
relief was either manifest from the beginning of the action or be2 62 N.E. 135 (N.Y. 1901); see also WALSH, supra note 20, § 22, at 113
(discussing holding of case).
2

Hahl, 62 N.E. at 136-37; see also Carroll v. Bullock, 101 N.E. 438, 439 (N.Y.

1913) (noting that Hahl v. Sugo decided that, "it is no longer necessary in such a
case... to establish the legal right before seeking equitable relief .... ").
'o Hahl, 62 N.E. at 137; see also Dawley v. Brown, 79 N.Y. 390, 399 (1880)
(holding that plaintiffs former action to establish title created estoppel in later action for ejectment).
31 Hahl, 62 N.E. at 137; see also Wright v. Nostrand, 94 N.Y.
32, 47 (1883)
(noting that plaintiffs only remedy was by appeal).
32 Hahl, 62 N.E. at 137. Criticisms of this case are noted in
CHARLES E. CLARK,
CLARK ON CODE PLEADING § 72, at 321 (1928). Clark himself did not condemn the
case and it is endorsed in WALSH, supra note 20, § 22, at 113-14; see also Jay Leo
Rothschild, The Simplification of Civil Practice in New York: A Review of Judicial
Experience Under the Civil Practice Act, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 619 (1923)
(acknowledging that under Code of Civil Procedure in New York, distinction between actions at law and suits in equity was abolished).
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came so during trial. An example based on Steinbach v. Relief
Fire Ins. Co.33 will illustrate the point. Suppose a plaintiff seeks
to recover on a fire insurance policy. The defendant insurance
company defends on the ground of breach of condition (storing of
hazardous materials), rendering the policy void. The plaintiff
has oral testimony that the insurer's agent knew of and consented to the storage of the materials in question as part of the
plaintiffs ordinary business. The testimony might be relevant in
three ways: first, to interpret the meaning of ambiguous language in the written policy; second, to estop the company from
forfeiting the policy; and third, to reform the written policy to
conform to the intent of the parties by striking the condition.
The first two possibilities do not entail an exclusively equitable
remedy,34 but the court may exclude the testimony in a jury trial
77 N.Y. 498 (1879).
The expression "exclusively equitable" refers to the mode of trying disputed
issues of fact. When the New York Chancery Court was abolished by the constitution of 1846 and its functions transferred to the reorganized New York Supreme
Court, the right to a jury trial was preserved "in all cases in which it has been heretofore used ... ." N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. 1, § 2 (1846). By that time, many principles that had originated in chancery had already been adopted by the common law
courts, such as the right of an assignee to sue on a contract, WALSH, supra note 20,
§ 19, at 93, and the right to plead fraud in the inducement as a defense to a contract
claim, Whitney v. Allaire, 4 Denio 554, 557 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847), aftd, 1 N.Y. 305
(1848). Since trial by jury was used at common law before the merger, these equitable rules that had become recognized at law prior to the merger came within the
constitutional guarantee of a jury trial. In short, they had lost their exclusively equitable character and, for procedural purposes, had become "legal." JAMES, JR. ET
AL., supra note 27, § 8.2 (noting that by 1791 there was no clear line between the
jurisdiction of courts at law and equity); WALSH, supra note 20, § 19, at 93 n.28
(distinguishing procedural from substantive characterization).
Estoppel is a principle of equitable origin. See 3 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE
ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 802 (5th ed. 1941). Estoppel had been denied application in early common law cases. See, e.g., Jennings v. Chenango County Mut. Ins.
Co., 2 Denio 75, 79-80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846); Cheriot v. Barker, 2 Johns. 346, 351
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807); Vandervoort v. Columbian Ins. Co., 2 Cal. R. 154, 160-61 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1804). On the eve of the merger, it was first applied at law. Frost v. Saratoga Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Denio 154, 155, 157-58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848). It was frequently
applied in jury trials thereafter. See, e.g., Rowley v. Empire Ins. Co., 36 N.Y. 550,
551, 555a (1867); Plumb v. Cattaraugus Co. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 N.Y. 392, 394-95
(1858).
Clearly actions (formerly bills in equity) for reformation of written documents
had never been recognized at common law. NORMAN FETTER, EQUITY JuRISPRUDENCE § 194 (1895); WALSH, supra note 20, § 110, at 514-16. And being exclusively equitable, these actions were triable by the court under the code system.
For many years after the merger it was not necessary in New York to determine whether estoppel had become a legal rule or had remained an exclusively equitable one. Prior to the enactment of the CPLR in 1963, the statutory right to jury
3
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because of the parol evidence rule.35 The same testimony, however, is traditionally admissible in equity, without a jury, to reform the written policy.36 If an amendment to the complaint is
trial depended solely on the historical character of the action brought by the plaintiff, DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 209 (2d ed. 1991). If the action was
historically "legal," such as an action to recover money under a contract, defensive
issues, even equitable ones, introduced in the action by the answer or reply were
triable by jury as a matter of right. Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. A.O. Anderson & Co.,
146 N.E. 381, 383 (N.Y. 1928); Bennett v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 58 N.E. 7, 7
(N.Y. 1900); DeForest v. Walters, 47 N.E. 294 (N.Y. 1897) (dictum); Southard v.
Curley, 31 N.E. 330, 330 (N.Y. 1892); McGurty v. Delaware Lackawana & Western
R.R. Co., 158 N.Y.S. 285, 287 (4th Dep't 1916); Wooden v. Waffle, 6 How. Pr. 145,
153 (N.Y. Spec. T. 1851) (dictum). Whether the "heretofore used" clause of the 1894
Constitution, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1894), constitutionalized the previous statutory jury right is a question that deserves serious discussion.
In 1963, CPLR 4101 made "equitable defenses" in legal actions triable by the
court alone. Rill v. Darling, 253 N.Y.S.2d 184, 186 (Sup. Ct. Madison County 1964)
(citing CPLR 4101 (1963)), affd, 251 N.Y.S.2d 396 (3d Dep't 1964). The new rule also
applied to equitable replications to legal defenses. Id. at 186. Nevertheless, estoppel
issues today routinely go before juries. See Tannenbaum v. Provident Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 364 N.E.2d 1122, 1123 (N.Y. 1977) (concluding that jury finding of estoppel was
supportable and proper); Wageman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 263 N.Y.S.2d 915,
918-19 (1st Dep't 1965) (vacating jury verdict and finding that plaintiff was estopped
by his actions from recovering), affd, 221 N.E.2d 566 (N.Y. 1966). Apparently estoppel, when raised by reply to defendant's affirmative defense, has acquired "legal"
status.
'5 Pindar v. Resolute Fire Ins. Co., 47 N.Y. 114, 117-18 (1871); see also Rohrbach
v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 47, 63-64 (1875) (declaring terms of agreement
controlling although they did not match intent of parties). These cases were distinguished in Van Schoick v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 68 N.Y. 434, 441 (1877) and their
application was limited in Whited v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 76 N.Y. 415, 419
(1879). See EDWIN W. CADY, OUTLINES OF INSURANCE § 66 (2d ed. 1925) (explaining
Van Schoick on waiver grounds).
3 Benett v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 12 N.E. 609 (N.Y. 1887). When the evidence
was equally relevant to recovery at law through the use of estoppel, see supra note
34, and in equity through reformation, the early code cases used juries, and accepted their verdicts as conclusive, not advisory. Maher v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 67 N.Y.
283, 288 (1876); see also Flynn v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 78 N.Y. 568, 578 (1879)
(rejecting New Jersey authority requiring reformation in equity prior to enforcement at variance with written warranty). Cf Pitcher v. Hennessy, 48 N.Y. 415, 422
(1872) (acknowledging reformation as an equitable defense litigable in jury trial).
See also Robbins v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 44 N.E. 159, 161 (N.Y. 1896)
(holding that on facts alleged and proved, written warranty was unenforceable and
stating that reliance on a particular theory of mistake, waiver or estoppel "is of but
little consequence, as any one of those theories is sufficient to avoid the defense relied upon in this case."); McCall v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 66 N.Y. 505, 517 (1876)
(affirming judgment on reformation theory where case was argued on estoppel theory); Houlden v. Farmers' Alliance Coop. Fire Ins. Co., 177 N.Y.S. 286, 290 (4th
Dep't 1919) (relying upon estoppel cases in order to support theory of mistake and
judgment to reform), affd, 132 N.E. 919 (N.Y. 1921); Mead v. Saratoga & Washington Fire Ins. Co., 80 N.Y.S. 885, 887 (3d Dep't 1903) (finding insurance company was
estopped from claiming fraud where agent misdescribed meat market as dwelling),
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necessary, it is routinely granted."
Suppose the critical testimony is excluded in the jury trial of
the plaintiffs action at law on the contract, and he fails to request equitable relief under which the testimony would be admissible. Without the testimony, the result is judgment for the
defendant insurer. May the plaintiff bring a subsequent action
seeking reformation and enforcement of the contract as reformed? The Steinbach case held the plaintiff barred by res judicata (claim preclusion).3 8 Consistent with the result reached in
the later Hahl v. Sugo case, where the removal of the encroachment was seen as the identical claim in both actions, 39 the Steinbach court saw the recovery of the insurance proceeds as the
common claim in both actions, notwithstanding the difference in
legal and equitable theories sought to be invoked in succession.
Admittedly, the scope of the relevant "claim" for the purpose
of claim preclusion is a difficult question to settle, and the New
York courts have not always been consistent in their approach.
However, the distinction between law and equity has not been
implicated in the more questionable cases. 0 With specific referaffd, 71 N.E. 1134 (N.Y. 1904).
', N.Y. CPLR 3025(b) (McKinney 1992); see SIEGEL, supra
note 34, § 237 (2d ed.
1991) (stating that leave to amend pleadings, at any time during proceedings, shall
be freely granted "[i]f there is no prejudice to the other side ... Q).
Cf. former N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Act § 111 (1920) and FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). See also CLARK, supra note 32,
§ 114, at 501-08 (noting that courts traditionally were hesitant to allow amendment
of pleadings where such would alter theory of recovery, though "modern" trend has
been more liberal toward amendment).
3 Steinbach v. Relief Fire Ins. Co., 77 N.Y. 498, 502 (1879).
Hahl v. Sugo, 62 N.E. 135, 138 (N.Y. 1901).
Compare Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 62 N.E. 772 (N.Y. 1902)
(passing on issue of bar and merger) with JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra note 27, § 11.9
(outlining difficulty in defining single cause of action in tort cases); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24, cmt. c., illus. 1 (1980) (stating that damage or injury

arising from single incident will give rise to only one cause of action under merger
doctrine). Unlike FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a), in New York counterclaims are not compulsory even when they arise from the same transaction that is the basis of the plaintiffs complaint. See Batavia Kill Watershed Dist. v. Charles 0. Desch, Inc., 444
N.Y.S.2d 958 (3d Dep't 1981) (holding New York law does not require compulsory
pleading of counterclaims), affd, 441 N.E.2d 1115 (N.Y. 1982). Accord National Fire
Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 81 N.E. 562, 563 (N.Y. 1907); Brown v. Gallaudet, 80 N.Y. 413,
417 (1880); Gates v. Preston, 41 N.Y. 113, 116 (1869); Tyler v. Standard Wine Co.,
102 N.Y.S. 65, 68 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1906), affd, 106 N.Y.S. 1148 (4th Dep't
1907). This rule has produced some anomalies in New York's approach to res judicata. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22 states:

A, a physician, brings an action against B for the price of medical services
rendered to B. B fails to plead and judgment by default is given against
him. B is not precluded from subsequently maintaining an action against A
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ence to law and equity, even the narrowest view of the relevant
"claim" concedes that where possession of the same piece of
property or the same sum of money is involved in successive actions, claim preclusion in the form of merger and bar is applicable, notwithstanding the fact that the first judgment was based
on common-law rules and the second action invokes equitable
rules.
This understanding of identity of claims in law and equity
was reaffirmed in Chief Judge Cardozo's notable opinion in
Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp..41 A seller
of coal had brought an action against five defendants for the
price of coal delivered in installments under a requirements contract. At issue was the liability of each defendant for coal delivered to others. The issue presented was whether the written
contract called for joint or several obligation. The court in that
action held the obligation joint and rendered judgment for the
plaintiff against all the defendants.42 Later, the seller brought
another action against the same defendants for the price of subsequent deliveries of coal. In this action the defendants counterclaimed to have the contract reformed to express the intent
that only those who had received a delivery were obligated to pay
for it. The New York Court of Appeals reversed a summary
judgment for the plaintiff on the counterclaim, holding that the
former judgment did not preclude the defendants from litigating
for malpractice relating to the services sued upon the prior action. (B is
precluded, however, from seeking restitution of any amount paid pursuant
to the judgment ... ).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22, illus. 2 (1980).
The rule stated accords with Judge Cardozo's analysis in Schuykill Fuel Corp.
v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 165 N.E. 456 (N.Y. 1929) (noting that decision in
one action will be conclusive as to meaning of contract terms but not as to whether
terms should be reformed). However, in the facts stated in the illustration, New
York has applied preclusion, ignoring the distinction between issues actually litigated and those merely logically entailed in an unlitigated (default) judgment. See
Blair v. Bartlett, 75 N.Y. 150, 153 (1878) (indicating that res judicata is applied to
facts asserted in default judgment); Dunham v. Bower, 77 N.Y. 76, 80 (1879) (noting
that any allegation expressly or impliedly involved in judgment is merged into that
judgment and cannot be relitigated); Collins v. Bennett, 46 N.Y. 490, 495 (1871)
(holding that judgment rendered in Justice Court was bar to suit in New York Supreme Court); Gates v. Preston, 41 N.Y. 113 (1869) (same); Weisinger v. Rosenberg,
108 N.Y.S. 1065, 1066 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1908) (same). See generally Maurice Rosenberg, CollateralEstoppel in New York, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 165 (1969) (examining
application of res judicata and collateral estoppel in New York courts).
41

165 N.E. 456 (N.Y. 1929).

4

Id. at 458.
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the merits of equitable reformation.4"
For obvious reasons, that aspect of claim preclusion called
merger would not preclude a seller from suing to collect the price
of goods subsequently delivered under an installment contract
after having successfully sued for the price of an earlier delivery." In keeping the "bar" aspect of claim preclusion coextensive
with the "merger" aspect, the New York Court of Appeals held
that the cause of action for the subsequent deliveries was different from that covered by the former judgment for earlier deliveries.45 Consequently, the defendants' obligation to pay the price
demanded in the second action was not concluded by the earlier
judgment against them. The court acknowledged that the issue
actually litigated in the former action (that the written contract
called for joint obligation) could not be re-litigated. 8 This holding applied what later came to be called collateral estoppel by
judgment,4 7 and more recently, issue preclusion.48 Since the equitable issue of reformation, and presumably proof of facts necessary to sustain it, had not been introduced in the former action,
the defendants were not precluded from raising it as a defense or
counterclaim within the format of the new cause of action
brought by the seller.
Cardozo's opinion acknowledged the authority of Steinbach
in shaping his definition of claim preclusion.49 An earlier judgment bars the losing party from raising any issue that could
have been raised originally, whether it was raised or not, when
its introduction in a second action could "destroy or impair rights
or interests established by the first [judgment]."' ° The opinion
noted that the second Steinbach action in equity sought to

4 id.
44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

4- Schuykill,
4SId. at 459.

165 N.E. at 458.

§ 26, cmt. g., illus. 7 (1980).

47Austin W. Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3
(1942) (coining phrase "collateral estoppel" to mean that matters actually litigated
and resolved cannot be re-litigated in subsequent action).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980). The Restatement defines
issue preclusion as "[w]hen an issue of fact or law is litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on
the same or a different claim." Id.
49Schuykill, 165 N.E. at 458.
50Id. at 457.
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"recover the same loss."51 The first judgment determined that
the company did not owe fire insurance proceeds and would have
been nullified if a second judgment, based on a new theory, found
that it did owe the proceeds. In the Schuylkill case, different
sums for different deliveries were at stake in the two actions. A
judgment that the buyer did not owe for the later deliveries
would not impair the seller's right to keep the money recovered
under the first judgment. In distinguishing Steinbach, Cardozo
noted that a "different question would have been presented if the
loss [at issue in the second case] had been a later one."52
The discussion thus far has emphasized that the combined
effect of the Hahl, Steinbach and Schuylkill cases was to establish an irreducible minimum criterion for identity of claims or
causes of action for the purpose of claim preclusion (ownership of
the same property or duty to pay the same sum of money). Beyond this narrow boundary, the scope of claim preclusion remained problematic. For example, where one renders services at
the request of another, the amount owed under an alleged express contract might differ only slightly from what would be
owed as the reasonable value on a quasi-contract theory. Both
theories may be joined in a single code action. Yet it was once
held that a final judgment denying recovery on an express contract because of the one year statute of frauds, or failure to prove
an express promise, did not preclude a second action for the
value of the same services on a quasi-contract theory.53 The difference in the measures of recovery coupled with the difference
in legal theory was thought sufficient to distinguish two distinct
causes of action. Similarly, an unsuccessful action in equity
seeking specific performance of a contract was once held different from a second action at law for damages for breach of the
same contract. "
More recent cases have enlarged upon the bare minimum
criteria established in the Hahl, Steinbach and Schuylkill cases.
5'Id. at 458.
62 Id.
52

Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 111 N.E.2d 209, 212 (N.Y. 1953), overruled by O'Brien v.

City of Syracuse, 429 N.E.2d 1158 (N.Y. 1981); 2 FREEMAN, supra note 16, § 736
(viewing the issue as one of election of remedy).
"4 Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., 198 N.Y.S. 766, 770 (1st Dep't 1923); see T.W.
Courens, Annotation, 26 A.L.R.2d 446 (1952). Cf Stambovsky v. Cohen, 1 A.2d 456,
459 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1938) (holding that denial of rescission on ground of timeliness does not bar action at law seeking damages upon fraudulent contract).
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Following the lead of the Restatement Second of Judgments,5 5
the New York Court of Appeals now holds that all claims arising
from the same factual transaction are concluded by the first
judgment resulting therefrom, both with respect to merger as to
the winner, 6 and bar as to the loser."' The earlier case allowing
a second action in quasi-contract following defeat in an action on
an express contract was expressly overruled," and it also seems
settled that no action for damages at law will be allowed following an adverse judgment in an action for specific performance. 9
Older cases" that had made inroads on the policy of claim preclusion in the name of ameliorating the problem of election of
remedies have also been shaken and are probably destined for
the scrap heap of legal history.
In sum, the holdings in Hahl, Steinbach and Schuylkill form
the basic core of a claim preclusion doctrine that has grown well
beyond the minimum criteria established by those cases. The
following illustration from the Restatement Second of Judgments
reaches a result contrary to CPLR 3002(d):
(A) sues (B) for breach of a written contract claiming money
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 24 (1980).

Smith v. Russell Sage College, 429 N.E.2d 746, 749-50 (N.Y. 1981) (dictum);
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18 & 24 (1980). Cf. Hahl v. Sugo, 62
N.E. 135 (N.Y. 1901), supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. Technically, the
merger aspect of claim preclusion only applies to the claimant, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 (1980). But in jurisdictions having a compulsory counterclaim rule, it in effect applies to the party against whom the claim is brought.
Even if the party defeats the claim brought against him, if he withholds a counterclaim arising from the same transaction, he is precluded from asserting it in a subsequent action. Charles A. Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim
Under Modern Pleading,39 IOWA L. REV. 255, 260 (1954).
The steps taken by the Court of Appeals towards a transactional definition of
claim preclusion must remain incomplete so long as New York adheres to its rule of
permissive counterclaims. See SIEGEL, supra note 34, § 224. New York's attenuated
view of claim preclusion in the context of counterclaims may be the cause of its overbroad approach to issue preclusion in that context.
57 Smith, 429 N.E.2d at 750; O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 429 N.E.2d 1158 (N.Y.
1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 19 and 24 (1980).
' O'Brien, 429 N.E.2d at 1160.
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25, cmt. i. (2), & illus. 17-18 (1980).
Cf Ajamian v. Schlanger, 103 A.2d 9 (N.J. 1954) (determining that consolidation of
law and equity courts broadened scope of claim preclusion).
' See, e.g., Mertz. v. Press, 91 N.Y.S. 264 (Ist Dep't 1904) (allowing action on
bond after earlier judgment foreclosing mechanic's lien), affid, 76 N.E. 1100 (N.Y.
1906); Sager v. Blain, 44 N.Y. 445 (1871) (allowing action for sum of money after
judgment denying replevin of specific money); Powers v. Mulford, 158 N.Y.S.2d 707
(2d Dep't 1956).
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damages. There is no breach unless the contract is interpreted
in a certain way. At trial (A) fails because the court does not accept (A)'s interpretation and rejects parol evidence offered by
(A) as to the meaning of the contract. Formerly the action - an
action at law - would have been dismissed but (A) would be free
to commence a suit in equity to reform the contract to accord
with what (A) claims to have been the true intention of the parties. In a modern system (A) could seek any needed remedy in a
single action. Hence if in the first action judgment went for (B)
for failure to prove a breach of the contract as written, and (A)
did not seek reformation in that action, (A) would be barred
from a second action for reformation.
Given the current enlarged scope of claim preclusion, the
rule created in CPLR 3002(d) is anachronistic today. Indeed, it
is doubtful whether the statute ever had a sound basis.
III. THE ORIGINS OF CPLR 3002(d)
In the previous discussion of an action on a written contract
followed by a second action to reform the contract and to recover
on it as reformed, the facts used in the example were said to2
6
have been based on the case of Steinbach v. Relief Fire Ins. Co.
The model accurately portrayed the facts themselves, but left out
the actual procedural history of the case. The hypothetical assumed that both actions were brought in New York and demonstrated that the plaintiff had ample opportunity to obtain full
relief in the first action. In the actual Steinbach case, the plaintiff brought his first action in a Maryland state court. The defendant insurance company had the case removed to the federal
circuit court for the district of Maryland on grounds of diversity
of citizenship." Unlike Maryland, which had taken some steps
toward merging law and equity,' the federal courts in the nineteenth century did not entertain any mixing of the two systems.
Although the original Judiciary Act of 1789 vested both legal and
equitable jurisdiction in federal courts,6 5 a division of function
(1980).
77 N.Y. 498 (1879); see supra text accompanying note 33.
63 Steinbach, 77 N.Y. at 500.
" CLARK, supra note 32, at 28-29; WALTER W. COOK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EQUITY 14-15 (4th ed. 1948).
'5 2 JAMES W. MOORE & JO D. LucAs, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
3.02-.09
(2d ed. 1992). Prior to the coalescing of law and equity in the federal courts, which
began with the Equity Rules of 1912 and was materially accelerated by the Law and
Equity Act of 1915, there were two procedures in the federal courts: one at law, a
6' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25, illus. 20
62
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was rigidly maintained. An action had to be brought on either
the "law side" or the "equity side" of the court. No joinder of equitable claims with legal claims was permitted,66 nor were equitable defenses allowed on the law side.6 7 Thus, owing to the defendant's removal of the case from state court to the law side of
the federal court, the plaintiff found himself in a forum not of his
choosing, and one which was deaf to any equitable relief, such as
reformation. Accordingly, the defendant won the first action
brought by Steinbach.68 Presumably, the plaintiff could have discontinued his action and brought a new bill on the equity side,69
but within the framework of the existing action, his possible equitable claim for reformation was not one which "could have been
litigated" within the rationale of claim preclusion. The New
York Court of Appeals in Steinbach overlooked this procedural
background, and unjustly held that the federal judgment precluded the subsequent reformation action in New York.
The problem created by the limited subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts in the nineteenth century was compounded by the rule of Swift v. Tyson.7° As nearly every law student knows, prior to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins' in 1938, the
federal courts in diversity cases did not consider themselves
second in equity. See infra note 69. The Judiciary Act provided "that suits in equity
shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where
plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch..
20 §16, 1 Stat. 82, 28 U.S.C. § 384.
C' Twist v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 274 U.S. 684 (1927); Cherokee Nation v.
Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890); Hurt v. Hollingsworth, 100 U.S. 100 (1879).
6 Northern Pac. R.R. v. Paine, 119 U.S. 561 (1887); Burnes v. Scott, 117 U.S.
582 (1886).
cSteinbach, 77 N.Y. at 500.
c9 It was not until the federal law and equity act was passed in 1915 that a case
mistakenly brought on the law side could be transferred to the equity side. Act of
March 3, 1915, c.90, 38 Stat. 956 (Judicial Code § 274(a)). Prior to that time, no
transfer could be ordered; rather, a new action was required, subject to such problems as the statute of limitations. Waldo v. Wilson, 231 F. 654 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 241 U.S. 673 (1916). As to bills mistakenly brought on the equity side, Cf
Curriden v. Middleton, 232 U.S. 633 (1914) (dismissing bill prior to Equity Rule 22
in 1912) with Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U.S. 207 (1918) (transferring case to law
side without lapse of statute of limitations under Rule 22).
7' 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tomldns, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). In Swift, the Supreme Court held that federal courts were not obliged to follow state court decisions under the Judiciary Act of 1789 when deciding an issue of
commercial law. Id. at 18.
"' 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the Supreme Court overruled Swift, holding that
there was no federal common law and federal courts were thus to apply the substantive law of the states in diversity cases. Id. at 79-80.
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bound to follow state common-law precedents in matters of general commercial law. One such common-law issue was the effect
of oral testimony to raise an estoppel against a party relying on a
written contract.
In Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Building Association,72 the plaintiff owned property upon which he had a fire insurance policy. Desiring additional insurance, he requested another policy from an agent of the defendant company. When the
plaintiff disclosed his existing policy, the agent agreed to issue a
concurrent policy. Presumably through inadvertence, the written policy delivered by the agent to the plaintiff contained an
"other insurance" clause: a condition voiding the policy in the
event of other insurance unless endorsed in writing in the policy.
The plaintiff retained the policy without reading it, and when a
fire loss occurred, the company denied liability. As in Steinbach,
the plaintiff sued in a (Nebraska) state court, and on defendant's
petition the case was removed to the law side of the Nebraska
federal court on diversity grounds.7"
Once again, as in Steinbach, the plaintiff found himself in a
common-law court not of his choosing. In this case, however, the
plaintiff seemingly had nothing to fear because on the facts of his
case, federal courts had previously borrowed the estoppel doctrine, originally crafted by equity, and applied it in actions on
the law side.74 Indeed, on similar facts, cases from both the state
of Nebraska and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit had denied equitable actions for reformation on
the ground that the legal remedy was adequate.75
The federal trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff, based
on a special verdict of the jury finding the facts as stated above.
The judgment was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals but was reversed by the United States Supreme Court.76 In
a long and rambling opinion the Court veered away from its own
prior precedent and held that the parol evidence rule barred oral
testimony of the facts supporting the estoppel (or waiver, as the
72

183 U.S. 308 (1902).

73 See id. at 309.
74 Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 222, 232-33 (1871); see

also American Life Ins. Co. v. Mahone, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 152 (1874).
7' Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Norwood, 69 F. 71 (8th Cir. 1895); Home Fire Ins.
Co. v. Wood, 69 N.W. 941, 942-43 (Neb. 1897).
7"Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Ass'n., 101 F. 77 (8th Cir. 1900),
rev'd, 183 U.S. 308 (1902).
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Court preferred to call it)."
The plaintiff then brought a second action in the Nebraska
state court seeking to reform the policy by striking out the other
insurance clause, and to recover the proceeds. The Nebraska
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff in a scathing opinion which, among other criticisms, anticipated the Erie
case by questioning the authority of the federal court to decide a
contract case on grounds alien to Nebraska law.78 As to the
problem of res judicata, the court noted the prior cases refusing
equitable relief because the estoppel issue could be raised in an
action at law, and stated:
The plaintiff began its action and prosecuted it to final judgment in reliance upon, and in strict conformity with, these decisions, the former of which was justified, as the court pronouncing it thought, by the opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Insurance Company v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall 233,
20 L.Ed 617. To say now that the plaintiff is estopped because
it failed in the first it instance to take its cause into a forum
whose doors were, to all appearances, firmly and finally bolted
and barred against it, would not fall short of a mockery of justice.79
Once again, the insurance company carried the case to the
United States Supreme Court on a writ of error, arguing that
Nebraska had failed to give full faith and credit to the prior federal court judgment. In unanimously affirming the state judgment granting reformation, the Court's opinion by Justice Holmes took it as given that the reformation action was a different
cause of action, not barred by res judicata." This assumption
was undoubtedly based on the limited subject matter jurisdiction
of the law side of the federal trial court in the prior action. The
only point to which Holmes gave real consideration was election
of remedies. Because an equitable remedy was apparently unavailable according to the cases on the books at the time the

"Northern Assurance, 183 U.S. at 328-329. The background and impact of this
case is fully described in WILLIAM R. VANCE, INSURANCE § 87 (3d ed. 1951).
78 Grand View Bldg. Assn. v. Northern Assurance Co., 102 N.W. 246 (Neb.
1905).
7 Id. at 248.
80 Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Assn., 203 U.S. 106, 107 (1906);
see Ash Sheep Co., v. United States, 252 U.S. 159, 170 (1920) (holding prior judgment not conclusive on issue that first tribunal lacked authority to address due to
nature of prior action).
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plaintiff started his original action at law, the Court held that he
had made no deliberate election of remedy."'
The Steinbach and Northern Assurance cases have been
stated at some length because they were the two cases chiefly
relied on by the New York Law Revision Commission when it
transmitted to the legislature its recommendation which resulted in the adoption of what is now CPLR 3002(d). The purpose of the statute, according to the Commission, was to overrule
Steinbach and follow NorthernAssurance.2
It is apparent that the Commission saw the question exactly
as Justice Holmes did in Northern Assurance: as one of election
of remedies solely. Indeed, the Commission's recommendation is
entitled "Relating to Election of Remedies" and subdivision (d)
was one of a series of four changes, the other three of which did
deal with that doctrine.' Subdivision (d) is the only one that allows a party who loses a final judgment in an attempt to recover
a sum of money to re-litigate a second action to recover the same
money on a different theory.'
Although election and claim preclusion can overlap when
applied to a given set of facts, the two doctrines are distinct.
When election applies, it is because a party has initiated a legal
proceeding on a stated theory or to obtain a stated remedy.85
8'Northern Assurance, 203 U.S. at 108. In doing so, Holmes distinguished
Washburn v. Great Western Ins. Co., 114 Mass. 175 (1873), in which election of
remedies was applied to a claimant who brought a bill in equity to reform a policy of
marine insurance by striking a promissory warranty concerning the magnum tonnage of coal. The plaintiff had previously lost an action at law in which he alleged
compliance with the warranty. The Washburn Court reasoned:
[the plaintiffs] bill does not assert an equitable right which, although
it
could not have been secured to him in the action at law, might coexist with
the right asserted by him in that action [which would apply to the litigation sequence in the NorthernAssurance case]; but proceeds on grounds
wholly inconsistent with those maintained by him in the action at law, and
seeks to show that his contract with the defendants was essentially different from that which he alleged, and submitted to the final judgment of the
court, in that action.
Id. at 176. Cf Knight v. Electric Household Util. Corp, 30 A.2d 585 (N.J. 1943)
(holding that where plaintiff has attempted to enforce contract as written, he has
elected his remedy and abandoned any attempt to seek reformation).
' Recommendation Relating to Election of Remedies [1939] New York Rev.
Comm'n Rep., 214-15.
13 Id.
at 215; see also 2 FREEMAN, supra note 16, § 696, at 1473-75 (viewing
question as one of election of remedies).
8
N.Y. CPLR 3002(d) (McKinney 1992).
' Fitzgerald v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 49 N.E.2d 489 (N.Y. 1943); Conrow v.
Little, 22 N.E. 346 (N.Y. 1889); Mollen v. Tuska, 87 N.Y. 166 (1881); see also SIEGEL,
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Claim preclusion applies when a legal proceeding has gone to final judgment." Contemporary thinking, while hostile to the
older predisposition to find a conclusive election by the mere
commencement of an action,' unmistakably supports reinforcing
the preclusive effect of final judgments.'
In NorthernAssurance, Holmes reached the issue of election
of remedies only because he accepted as too obvious for discussion the proposition that a law judgment could neither merge nor
bar equitable issues that could not have been litigated in an exclusively common-law forum. Steinbach erred only in neglecting
to take account of the proposition that Holmes recognized and
acted upon.
Unfortunately, in its zeal to redress some fossilized election
of remedies cases, the Law Revision Commission overlooked the
peculiar procedural background of the Steinbach and Northern
Assurance cases, and drew legislation broadly to apply to any
case in which an adverse judgment in an action on a written contract was followed by a reformation action, without regard to
whether or not the plaintiff had a fair opportunity to tender his
equitable issue in the earlier action.89 In doing so, it trespassed
on territory belonging to claim preclusion. Ironically, the circumstance that produced the difficulty in the earlier cases-the
limited subject matter jurisdiction on the law side of the federal
courts-had been eliminated by the new federal rules in 1938,90
supra note 34, § 218.
r' SIEGEL, supra note 34, § 444. The purpose of requiring a final judgment on
the merits is to ensure finality. Id. In New York, the fact that an appeal has been
initiated and is pending does not divest the judgment of its finality. Id.; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17-18 (1980).
87 JACK WEINSTEIN, ET. AL, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE §§ 3002.01-.02 (1992);
CLARK, supra note 32, § 76; Jay Leo Rothschild, A Remedy for Election of Remedies:
A ProposedAct to Abolish Election of Remedies, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 141 (1929).
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introduction, ch. 9-10 (1980). "The
rules of res judicata in modem procedure therefore may fairly be characterized as
illiberal toward the opportunity for relitigation." Id. at 10.
" Weissman v. Friend, 285 N.Y.S.2d 906 (3d Dep't 1967) (holding that pursuant
to CPLR 3002(d), action for reformation of shareholders' agreements was not barred
by res judicata); Scheer v. Nething, 122 N.Y.S.2d 270, 271 (2d Dep't 1953) (holding
that adverse judgment in action on contract did not bar new action to reform contract). But see Falkowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 25 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1941) (holding that if same facts sought to be established in second action for reformation were litigated in earlier action on contract (presumably on estoppel theory), earlier adverse judgment precluded second action).
,. FED. R. CIrv. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.'"); see also FED R. CIV. P. 38(a) (preserving right of trial by jury); JAMES W.
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the year before the Commission made its recommendation.
Not only is the statute over-broad in relation to the hardship
that once existed, it is under-inclusive with respect to other
situations equally deserving of the kind of relief it purports to
provide. As written, the statute only relieves plaintiffs who neglect to seek reformation in an action on a contract. What about
defendants? The facts of Bennett v. Edison Electric Co., suggest

an illustration. Suppose an excavating contractor sues an owner
for work done under a written contract calling for payment at a
rate of $10.00 per cubic foot excavated. If the owner tries to testify that he only promised to pay $1.00 per cubic foot, the evidence will undoubtedly be excluded under the parol evidence
rule and the contractor will recover judgment. After that judgment becomes final, may the owner bring an action against the
contractor to have the written contract reformed for fraud or
mistake, and thereby avoid paying the earlier judgment or obtain restitution of money paid pursuant to it? The answer is
clearly no. The owner had the opportunity of pleading an equitable defense in the first action. The same payment obligation is
at issue in both cases and the court would hold the claims identical. The owner is precluded not only as to issues actually litigated in the contract action, but also as to issues that could have
been litigated (claim preclusion)."
Any legislator who today proposed a statute overturning the
result in this situation would be laughed to scorn. The only justification for allowing the owner to raise his equitable claim in a
second action would be if the court in which the original action
MOORE & Jo D. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

2.06 (2d ed. 1992); FLEMING

JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.7 (3d ed. 1985).
91
2

58 N.E. 7 (N.Y. 1900).

Schuykill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 165 N.E. 456 (N.Y.

1929); Massari v. Einsiedler, 78 A.2d 572 (N.J. 1951). The Restatement (Second) of
Judgments has no section precisely covering the example of a law defendant who
withholds an equitable defense and later seeks to nullify the adverse judgment by
an equitable action. A close parallel is found in section 22(2)(b), dealing with withheld counterclaims, cmt. f., illus. 9-10. The necessity of this result also derives from
the general rule that equity will not enjoin a party from suing at law where his
remedies in that forum are adequate, which they obviously are in a merged system
that allows equitable defenses in legal actions. Compare Haire v. Baker, 5 N.Y. 357,
361-62 (1851) (holding that defense at law could be used in suit in equity) with
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 80 U.S. 616, 623 (1871) (stating that, absent
special circumstances, when party has good defense at law to "purely legal demand"
he should use such defense rather than resort to seeking equitable relief). It would
be nonsensical for equity to abstain while a legal action is pending, yet overhaul the
judgment afterwards.
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on the contract was brought was an exclusively common-law
court that did not entertain equitable defenses. This is precisely
the system that existed before the merger of law and equity in
New York in 1848; and prior to that time the later bill in equity
would have been allowed.93
The anachronism illustrated in the hypothetical case of the
defendant is exactly parallel to the actual Steinbach and Northern Assurance cases that the Law Revision Commission took as
negative and positive models in drafting its statute. The plaintiffs in those cases deserved a second chance at seeking equitable
reformation only because that relief was unavailable to them on
the law side of the federal court in the nineteenth century. To
use the unhappy position of pre-merger defendants as a reason
for allowing defendants today a second chance to litigate equitable defenses would be absurd. Yet that is exactly what CPLR
3002(d) allows plaintiffs, with respect to their equitable claims.
IV. KWIATKOWSKJ REVISITED

At this point, it is appropriate to reassess the Kwiatkowski
case set forth at the beginning of the article.94 Is CPLR 3002(d)
needed to prevent a repetition of the injustice resulting from that
case? The decision is a composite of a harsh substantive rule
and an extreme application of a retrogressive procedural rule.
On the substantive side, many early cases had allowed estoppel
at law to avoid forfeiture of insurance coverage based on written
warranties and conditions, upon proof that the facts were known
to the company's agent, or the warranted facts were inserted in
the written application by the agent without the applicant's
knowledge.95 Beginning with (then) Justice Lehman's opinion in
93 King

v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384, 388 (N.Y. 1819); see also Gregory v. Burrall, 2
417,
421 (N.Y. 1835) (noting that courts of equity can entertain suits and
Edw. Ch.
grant relief notwithstanding judgments at law); Webster v. Wise, 1 Paige Ch. 319
(N.Y. 1829); Briggs v. Law, 4 Johns. Ch. 22 (N.Y. 1819) (enforcing judgment at law
via injunction); Livingston v. Hubbs, 2 Johns. Ch. 512 (N.Y. 1817) (same); see also
Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N.Y. 156, 158 (1854) (holding Connecticut chancery decree enjoining enforcement of New York common-law judgment is res judicata in equitable
defense pursued under reformed procedure in New York).
See supra text accompanying notes 3-14.
"Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 62 N.E. 763 (N.Y. 1902) (holding
that medical examiner is agent of insurance company, and insurer is therefore estopped from taking advantage of examiner's errors in reporting answers on policy);
Miller v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 14 N.E. 271 (N.Y. 1887) (holding that insurer
was estopped from claiming answers to questions in life insurance application were
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Bollard v. New York Life Ins. Co.,9" in 1917, the courts receded
from their former pro-consumer holdings and rendered a series
of decisions that protected the insurance industry from having
its written contracts impeached by parol evidence before sympathetic juries.9" Perhaps some of the early cases had not paid
incorrect where answers were filled in by insurer's agent and not read back to insured); Flynn v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 78 N.Y. 568 (1879) (holding insured estopped from taking advantage of untrue answers written in policy by its agent);
Whited v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 76 N.Y. 415 (1879) (binding insurance company to
statements made by agent); Mowry v. Rosendale, 74 N.Y. 360 (1878) (estopping insurance company from denying responsibility for risk subscribed by its agents on
inappropriate form); Rowley v. Empire Ins. Co., 36 N.Y. 550 (1867) (holding mistakes made by insurance company's agent are imputed to company).
162 N.Y.S. 706 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st. Dep't 1917), affd, 168 N.Y.S. 1102 (1st
Dep't 1918), affd, 126 N.E. 900 (N.Y. 1920) (per curiam).
97 The shift in the court's position was occasioned by a statute
enacted in 1906.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 58 (amended in 1939 as N.Y. INS. LAW § 142 and currently codified
as N.Y. INS. LAW § 3204(c)). This law effectively eliminated strict warranties in life
insurance policies and transformed them into "representations" that avoided a policy only if material to the risk undertaken. It also provided that no written application could be considered part of the insurance contract, unless physically attached to
the policy. Thence forward, in cases covered by section 58, an insurer could not defend a claim based on misrepresentations in an application if it was not attached to
the policy when delivered to the insured. Archer v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 112
N.E. 433 (N.Y. 1916); Bible v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 176 N.E. 838 (N.Y.
1931). Bollard held that the insured's failure to read the application after it was returned to him was such laches as to counteract his traditional right to estop the insurer from relying on statements inserted in the application by company agents
without the applicant's knowledge. Accord Minsker v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 173 N.E. 4 (N.Y. 1930). Ms. Kwiatkowski received none of the benefits of the
statute and all of its burdens. Since section 58 did not apply to fraternal benefit insurance, see Hoff v. Hoff, 161 N.Y.S. 520 (3rd Dep't 1916), the disparity between the
actual number of children (seven) and the number (three) written by the company's
agent was allowed to operate as a strict warranty instead of a representation as
provided in section 58. Had the statute applied, the issue of materiality would have
been for the jury. On a warranty, materiality was irrelevant. Having denied
Kwiatkowski the statutory benefits, the court extended to her case the burden of
losing her estoppel claim because her application had been (without statutory compulsion) returned with the certificate. Both before and after Kwiatkowski, the court
extended the anti-estoppel rationale of Bollard to insurance policies not covered by
section 58, provided that the relevant document was in fact, though without compulsion of law, physically returned to the insured. Satz v. Massachusetts Bonding &
Ins. Co., 153 N.E. 844 (N.Y. 1926); Stanulevich v. St. Lawrence Life Ass'n, 127 N.E.
315 (N.Y. 1920).
Perhaps the most extreme reaction against an insured's use of estoppel occurred in Axelroad v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 196 N.E. 388 (N.Y. 1935). In Axelroad, an insured signed a blank reinstatement application, which was later completed with substantial misrepresentations by the company's agent without the
insured's knowledge or consent. Id. at 441. The fact that the agent did not attach
the application to the policy given to the insured was held to be of no moment, as
reinstatement applications were not subject to section 58. Id. at 450-51. The court
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enough attention to the problem of possible collusion between
agents greedy for commissions and applicants who knew or
should have known that they were ineligible for insurance.9 8
However, the later cases went too far in the other direction by
denying estoppel to the deserving and undeserving alike.99
Whatever the case may be, in changing its estoppel rule, the
New York Court of Appeals never denied that the same or similar evidence that was excluded in the action to enforce the written contract was admissible under an equitable claim to reform
the contract. It is clear that fear of jury lawlessness lay at the
heart of the change in the law. As Justice Holmes wrote in a
contemporary case before the United States Supreme Court:
Of course if the insured can prove that he made a different contract from that expressed in the writing he may have it reformed in equity. What he cannot do is to take a policy without
reading it and then when he comes to sue at law upon the instrument ask to have it enforced otherwise than according to its
terms. The court is not at liberty to introduce a short cut to retherefore denied the use of estoppel and the policyholder was held bound to the misrepresentations written in the reinstatement application by the agent. Id. at 451.
These holdings remain law at the present time. Friedman v. Prudential Life
Ins. Co., 589 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that misrepresentations made
by insured are not attributable to insurer's agent even if agent is actually responsible for physically writing false information); Bloom v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 557
N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (3d Dep't 1990) (holding that insurance company is not estopped
from denying coverage because of misrepresentations made by insurance agent on
life insurance application); Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. ONeil, 413 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1st
Dep't 1979) (stating that policy was void because misrepresentations about insured's
medical condition made by agent were so flagrant that insured should have been
aware); see also 68 N.Y. JUR. 2D, Insurance, § 366 (1988).
9' If a court perceived collusion between the applicant and the company's agent
in providing false information in the insurance application, neither the early nor the
recent cases allowed a theory of imputed knowledge to work an estoppel against the
insurer in aid of a wrongdoer. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U.S. 519
(1886); McCormack v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 N.E. 74 (N.Y. 1917); Simon v.
Government Employees Life Ins. Co., 434 N.Y.S.2d 447 (2d Dep't 1980).
* The reasoning of Bollard and its progeny that the insured should read his
policy and attached application after it is mailed to him runs contrary to experience.
EDWIN W. PATTERSON, ESsENT-Ls OF INSURANCE LAW 514 (2d ed. 1957) ("It seems

not unlikely that an insurer receiving such a letter [correcting a misstatement in
the application] would suspect the insured of being a crank or insane."). Moreover, it
has been noted that "it would seem reasonable to hold that the insurer delivering an
instrument which he knows will not be read is not justified in assuming that all of
its terms are assented to." VANCE, supra note 77, at 263 n.20; see also RE.
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 211 (1979) (describing standardized agreements). An attempt to reestablish a middle ground based on the applicant's good
faith appears in (then) Justice Breitel's opinion in Wageman v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 263 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1st Dep't 1965), affd, 221 N.E.2d 566 (N.Y. 1966).
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formation by letting the jury strike out a clause.100

Although the New York Court of Appeals gave reasons for
its express holdings that parol evidence was inadmissible at law
to estop enforcement of written contract terms, it never openly
confronted a related procedural question. Under code practice
the right to jury trial attached to the type of action brought by
the plaintiff, not to issues injected into the case by new matter
raised in the answer or reply. °" If an action, as pleaded, was
traditionally one that would have been brought in the commonlaw court before the merger, it attracted the right to jury trial of
all issues of fact raised therein."°2 Conversely, if the action, as
pleaded, would have been within the subject matter jurisdiction
of the old chancery court, there was no right to trial by jury of
any issue of fact under the code system.0 3
Under this test, an action brought to reform a contract and
recover on it as reformed was not triable by jury."' An action
10

Lumber Underwriters v. Rife, 237 U.S. 605, 610 (1915). Holmes had previ-

ously taken a similar position as a state court judge. Batchelder v. Queen Ins. Co.,
135 Mass. 449 (1883).
In commenting on the older New York cases, see supra note 93, the New Jersey
common-law court complained that they were "the decisions of courts in which the
legal and equitable jurisdictions are so blended that the functions of a court of equity have been transferred to the jury box." Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Martin, 40
N.J.L. 568, 579 (1878). The Martin case was expressly overruled and estoppel at law
was permitted in Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1969).
After Bollard, New York continued to apply estoppel in cases where the facts
did not present the opportunity for collusion between an applicant and an agent,
and were established by parol evidence. Davern v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co.,
150 N.E. 129 (N.Y. 1925).
01'See N.Y. CODE OF PROC. §§ 253 (1851) (specifying which issues of fact should
be tried by jury), 250 (defining issues of fact), 254 (describing issues to be tried by
court); see also Hale v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 49 N.Y. 626, 631 (1872) (stating that
court may grant whatever judgment is consistent with case made by complainant
and embraced within the issues whether it would sustain action at law or in equity).
102 See Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. A.O. Anderson & Co.,
146 N.E. 381, 384 (N.Y.
1925).
103 Bell v. Merrifield, 16 N.E. 55, 56 (N.Y. 1888); In
re Beare's Estate, 203 N.Y.S.
483 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1924), affid, 209 N.Y.S. 793 (1st Dep't 1925); Moffat v. Mount, 17
Abb. Pr. 4 (N.Y. Super. Ct. Gen. T. N.Y. County 1863).
104 Since such cases were tried in chancery, without a jury, before the merger,
Many v. Beekman Iron Co., 9 Paige Ch.188 (N.Y. 1841); Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns.
Ch. 585, 595 (N.Y. 1817), and could not be entertained at common law, see Lewitt &
Co. v. Jewelers Safety Fund Soc., 164 N.E. 29 (N.Y. 1928) (same); Hay v. Star Fire
Ins. Co., 77 N.Y. 235 (1879) (same); Kilmer v. Smith, 77 N.Y. 226 (1879) (same);
Cheriot v. Baker, 2 Johns. 346, 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807) (same), they were triable in
the merged system without a jury. Wells v. Yates, 44 N.Y. 525 (1871) (reformation
action tried at special term); Johnson v. Taber, 10 N.Y. 319 (1852) (transferring to
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brought to recover on a written contract was triable by jury."5
Under the early code cases, however, a good deal depended on
how the complaint was pleaded. If the plaintiff wished to anticipate an affirmative defense based on the written contract, he
could bring an action to reform.' He might, however, choose not
to anticipate the defense and plead the terms of the alleged contract as he construed them ultimately to be. The defendant was
then required to plead as new matter in its answer the written
terms and extrinsic facts, such as breach of warranty, upon
which it sought to rely. 10 7 Under the code, no express reply was
required from the plaintiff. New matter in the answer was
deemed traversed or avoided, as the case required.'018 When it is
also borne in mind that an express request for relief was not a
necessary part of a cause of action,' 9 it seems clear that evidence
special term (non-jury) of newly created New York State Supreme Court because
bill for reformation filed in chancery court prior to merger).
"5 Glenn v. Lancaster, 109 N.Y. 641, 642 (1888) (holding action based on contract to recover monetary damages only is triable by jury); Rockwell v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 4 Abb. Pr. 179 (N.Y. Super. Ct. N.Y. County 1857) (holding that court considers entire circumstances to decide whether trial by jury is necessary). Cf N.Y.
CPLR 4101 (McKinney 1992) (defining issues triable by jury).
..Bennett v. Agricultural Ins. Co. of Watertown, 12 N.E. 609 (N.Y. 1887); Van
Tuyl v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 55 N.Y. 657 (1873). On anticipating defenses generally, see CLARK, supra note 32, at 250-52 and Judge Clark's opinion in Alcoa S.S.
Co. v. Ryan, 211 F.2d 576, 578 (2d Cir. 1954).
'0' Goldschmidt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 7 N.E. 408 (N.Y. 1886) (holding that
burden fell on defendant to prove facts pertinent to terms of contract and resulting
in denial of insurance coverage); Jacobs v. Northwestern Life Assur. Co., 51 N.Y.S.
967, 968 (2d Dep't 1898) (stating that breach of warranty is affirmative defense
which defendant must plead and prove), affd, 58 N.E. 1088 (N.Y. 1900).
"" N.Y. Code of Proc. § 168 (1851); N.Y. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 522 (1877); N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. ACT §§ 243, 274 (1938); N.Y. CPLR 3011 (1963) (describing types of
pleadings); see Meyer v. Lathrop, 73 N.Y. 315, 322 (1878) (noting that plaintiff was
not required to reply to defense in answer and could wait until trial); Bates v.
Rosekrans, 37 N.Y. 409 (1867); Linker v. Jamison, 159 N.Y.S. 469 (2d Dep't 1916);
Jacobs v. Northwestern Life Assur. Co., 51 N.Y.S. 967 (2d Dep't 1898), affd, 58 N.E.
1088 (N.Y. 1900). In Sullivan v. Traders Ins. Co., 62 N.E. 146 (N.Y. 1901), plaintiffs'
express equitable reply was approved over a dissent objecting to the procedure as
indirectly amending a legal complaint to add an equitable cause of action.
For a similar rule in federal practice, see Neeff v. Emery Transp. Co., 284 F.2d
432 (2d Cir. 1960).
"9 From the first Field Code, see Code of Proc. § 275, it was provided that
though relief must be consistent with the facts pleaded, it need not be the relief
need not be specifically demanded. Emery v. Pease, 20 N.Y. 62, 64 (1859). See generally CIV. PRAC. ACT §§ 472-84 (judgments); N.Y. CPLR 3017(a) (McKinney 1992).
Nor was it necessary for the judgment to expressly provide for formal reformation
where the legal relief awarded was consistent therewith. Maher v. Hibernia Ins.
Co., 67 N.Y. 283 (1876); Hoppough v. Struble, 60 N.Y. 430, 434 (1860) (stating that
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in aid of the automatic reply in equitable avoidance of the insurer's affirmative legal defense was admissible within the context of an action triable by jury as a matter of right."' In short,
equitable issues arising by way of replication to legal defenses
were triable by jury in legal actions, just as equitable defenses to
legal actions were so triable."' It was not until the CPLR replaced the former Civil Practice Act in 1963 that the right to jury
trial of equitable defenses and replications in legal actions was
withdrawn and such issues were made triable by the court
alone.'
Obviously, the whole purpose of protecting written contracts
(particularly insurance contracts) against jury verdicts based on
estoppel would have gone for naught if similar parol evidence,
admittedly relevant to equitable reformation, could go before the
defendant can avail himself of equitable defense in legal action seeking ejectment);
see also Broidy v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 186 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding
judgment as sufficient without formal findings on which to base claim of reformation).
10 See Wilcox v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 N.E. 153, 154 (N.Y. 1903)
(recognizing that plaintiff could produce evidence of fraud on appeal to court of equity); Kirchner v. New Home Sewing Mach. Co., 31 N.E. 1104, 1106 (N.Y. 1892)
(implying that plaintiffs right to recover will not be barred if he can prove that the
cause of action was released due to adversary's fraud); Grattan v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 80 N.Y. 281, 294 (1880) (noting that it was not improper for plaintiff to
submit evidence of fraud if it was grounds for reformation); Meyer v. Lathrop, 73
N.Y. 315, 322 (1878) (stating that when agreement is presented at trial, plaintiff has
right to produce evidence of mistake although not set forth in complaint);
Mandeville v. Reynolds, 68 N.Y. 528, 543 (1877) (finding that "[j]udgment obtained
by fraud upon a court, binds not such court or any other, and its nullity upon that
ground ...
may be alleged in a collateral proceeding"); McGurty v. Delaware L. & W.
R. Co., 158 N.Y.S. 285, 287 (4th Dep't 1916) (stating that various provisions of Code
of Civil Procedure "are to be construed as declaratory of [ ] right [to trial by jury],
rather than as modifying or infringing it."). When a defendant interposed a legal defense, such as breach of warranty, in its answer, the statutes cited in note 108 supra
operated to create an issue in replication to the answer. "For that purpose [the
automatic statutory reply], evidence admissible under the principles of either law or
equity, takes the place of pleading." Arthur v. Homestead Fire Ins. Co., 78 N.Y. 462,
467 (1879).
. Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. A. 0. Andersen & Co., 146 N.E. 381, 384 (N.Y. 1925)
(stating that "equitable defenses are triable in the same way as defenses that are
legal").
11 N.Y. CPLR 4101 (McKinney 1992) ("[Eiquitable defenses and equitable
counterclaims shall be tried by the court."); see Rill v. Darling, 253 N.Y.S.2d 184, 185-86
(Sup. Ct. Madison County 1964) (illustrating problems resulting from trial treatment afforded to equitable counterclaims and equitable defenses under Civil Practice Act prior to enactment of CPLR 4101), affd, 21 A.D.2d 955, 251 N.Y.S.2d 396
(3d Dep't 1964). But see CPLR 4212 (permitting court to submit any issue of fact required to be decided by court to advisory jury).
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same juries. By the time the Kwiatkowski case was decided, the
New York Court of Appeals had responded to the dilemma indirectly by moving perilously close to reinventing the old imaginary boundary lines dividing the forms of action, and particularly the line dividing law from equity. Again departing from
earlier code cases that had welcomed a generous approach to the
fusion of law and equity within a single litigation,"' the New
York Court of Appeals in Jackson v. Strong. applied a rule
called "theory of the pleadings""5 that sharply limited the powers
of trial courts to respond flexibly to facts as they developed at
trial."6 Even if the facts originally alleged, or sought to be added
by amendment to conform to the evidence, showed some actionable claim, it could not be addressed if the grouping of facts in
the original complaint was patterned on another legal theory."7
113

See Flynn v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 78 N.Y. 568, 578 (1879) (supporting con-

solidation of law and equity into one lawsuit); Lattin v. McCarty, 41 N.Y. 107 (1869)
(following earlier cases which upheld one action for legal and equitable claims and
allowing plaintiffs equitable action to clear title to be tried with legal action to recover possession of premises); New York Ice Co. v. North W. Ins. Co., 23 N.Y. 357,
360 (1861) (noting that legal and equitable grounds for relief should be united in
same action); Emery v. Pease, 20 N.Y. 62, 64 (1859) (recognizing that distinction between legal and equitable remedies no longer exist); Laub v. Buckmiller, 17 N.Y.
620, 626 (1858) (stating that "legal and equitable relief may be asked for in one action."); Phillips v. Gorham, 17 N.Y. 270, 274 (1858) (finding that "a complaint needs
only to contain facts constituting a cause of action, recognising no distinction of
causes of action into legal or equitable."); see generally Clark, supra note 32, at 321
(discussing various cases supporting one cause of action for legal and equitable relieO.
11 118 N.E. 512 (N.Y. 1917). Plaintiff pleaded a contract of partnership and
sought an equitable accounting. The proof showed a contract of employment payable
in quantum meruit. A referee's award of a sum owed under the contract was reversed because a recovery of damages on a legal ground could not be had where the
complaint was based on an historically equitable ground. Id. at 512-13.
'nSee SIEGEL, supra note 34, § 209 (explaining "theory of pleadings").
11. See Southwick v. First Nat'l Bank, 61 How. Pr. 164, 170 (1881) (stating that
"[ilf a party can allege one cause of action and then recover upon another, his complaint will serve no useful purpose, but rather to ensnare and mislead his adversary."); Barnes v. Quigley, 59 N.Y. 265, 268 (1874) (holding that it was error for
court below to change plaintiffs cause of action). The Barnes court noted that "the
Code [of Procedure] ...
does not permit a cause of action to be changed ...
because
[plaintiffi has mistaken his remedy."). Id.
1, See Feldblum Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 269 N.Y.S. 793, 794 (N.Y.
City Ct. Bronx County 1934) (allowing substitution of different legal theory of recovery through amendment of complaint but noting that "an amendment seeking an
entirely different cause of action would be allowed only on severest terms."); see also
E. F. Albertsworth, The Theory of the Pleadingsin Code States, 10 CAL. L. REV. 202,
202-03 (1922) (illustrating that although amendments to pleadings were eventually
permitted, they could not introduce new cause of action); see generally Bernard V.
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Thus sixty years after the first Field Code was adopted, the New
York Court of Appeals marched resolutely backward, like the
surgeon who, when he opened up a patient in search of a tumor,
would look only for tumors." 8
Today, all this is ancient history. Juries are excluded from
equitable issues,"' and the CPLR makes ample provision for
adapting the shape of the case to new facts and theories.12 The
Lentz, Note, The Extent to Which a PlaintiffMust Proceed Upon a Definite Theory,
83 U. PA. L. REV. 654 (1935) (discussing limitations on amendments to complaint);
William F. Walsh, Merger of Law and Equity Under Codes and Other Statutes, 6
N.Y.U. L. REV. 157 (1929) (suggesting that cases filed in improper court should not
be dismissed, but transferred).
18 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19. Forty years earlier, on similar
facts, the New York Court of Appeals held that it was error to dismiss a complaint
because it erroneously requested equitable relief and established a right to legal relief on the facts alleged and proved. Williams v. Slote, 70 N.Y. 601, 602 (1877); accord New York Ice Co. v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 23 N.Y. 357, 359 (1861); Emery v.
Pease, 20 N.Y. 62, 64-65; see also Clark, supra note 22, at 8-9 n.31 (examining New
York cases before and after legal and equitable claims could be tried in one cause of
action).
...
N.Y. CPLR 4101 (McKinney 1992); see also Federman v. Berger, 216
N.Y.S.2d 61, 62 (1st Dep't 1961) (stating that defendants waived right to jury trial
by imposition of equitable counterclaims); Menado Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 279
N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1967) (denying jury trial based on CPLR
4101). Although the language of the statute does not explicitly mention equitable
replications to legal defenses, it has properly been held that it applies. Rill v. Darling, 253 N.Y.S.2d 184, 186 (Sup. Ct. Madison County 1964), affd, 251 N.Y.S.2d 396
(3d Dep't 1964); accord Michael Rose Prods. Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 19 F.R.D. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (discussing reformation issue in federal practice arising by way of
reply to affirmative defense of release).
Under federal practice, although Hoad v. New York Cent. R.R., 3 F. Supp. 1020,
1020 (W.D.N.Y. 1933) expressed some doubt, it seems clear that mistake in the inducement of a written release, arising by way of reply, presents an equitable issue
for the court, not a legal issue for the jury. See Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Ryan, 211 F.2d 576,
578 (2d Cir. 1954) (stating that "[t]he issue of mistake, in the making of an agreement ... seems one for court and not jury trial under the federal practice."); see also
Lion Oil Ref. Co. v. Albritton, 21 F.2d 28.0, 282 (8th Cir. 1927) (noting that in case of
mutual mistake, "equity can grant relief); Lumley v. Wabash R.R. Co., 76 F. 66, 70
(6th Cir. 1896) (stating that "[e]quity relieves from mistakes"), affd, 96 F. 773
(1899).
120 See CPLR 3017(a) (stating that "the court may grant any type of relief within
its jurisdiction appropriate to proof whether or not demanded, imposing such terms
as may be just."); id. § 3025(c) (stating that "[t]he court may permit pleadings to be
amended before or after judgment to conform them to the evidence."); id. § 3026
(stating that "[p]leadings shall be liberally construed [and] [d]efects shall be ignored
if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced."); see also McGinnis v. Bankers
Life Co., 334 N.Y.S.2d 270, 276 (2d Dep't 1972) (indicating that "[miodern civil
practice codes such as the CPLR have abolished technical rules of pleading ...
SIEGEL, supra note 34, § 209 (stating that "[iut is today permissible ... to prove a
theory different from that pleaded, as long as the pleading gives notice of the transaction out of which the proved claim arises and covers its material elements.").
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only residue of Jackson v. Strong is the legitimate concern that a
defendant originally sued on a purely equitable theory be given
an opportunity to insist on a jury trial if the plaintiffs case belatedly reduces itself to a legal one."'
Reform, however, lay in the future at the time Ms.
Kwiatkowski sought her remedy in our legal system. Under the
influence of Jackson v. Strong, her evidence that was relevant to
reformation was not considered in an action pleaded on a legal
contract theory. The court conveniently forgot the older cases
allowing reformation evidence to go before the jury under the
automatic statutory replication. 2 Such a severe application of
the "theory of the pleadings" doctrine was particularly inappropriate in the context of the Kwiatkowski case. There was no
possible prejudice or surprise involved. There was only one disputed question of fact in the case, and the evidence was equally
relevant on an estoppel theory or a reformation theory. If reformation had been expressly pleaded in the complaint, the judge,
Even before the reforms effected by the CPLR, New York courts had receded
from the rigidity of Jackson v. Strong. See Wainwright & Page, Inc. v. Burr &
McAuley, Inc., 5 N.E.2d 64, 65 (N.Y. 1936) (finding contract complaint at law requesting inappropriate relief contained sufficient facts to support accounting in equity); Milliken v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 N.E. 251, 252 (N.Y. 1888) (noting that
"[t]he present system of pleading does not require that the conclusions of law should
be set forth in the pleading, provided the court can see ... the facts stated impose a
legal obligation upon the defendant."); Emery, 20 N.Y. at 64 (stating that "relief is to
be given consistent with the facts stated, although it be not the relief specifically
demanded").
"' CPLR 4103 provides:
Issues triable by a jury revealed at trial; demand and waiver of trial by
jury. When it appears in the course of a trial by the court that the relief
required, although not originally demanded by a party, entitles the adverse
party to a trial by jury of certain issues of fact, the court shall give the adverse party an opportunity to demand a jury trial of such issues. Failure to
make such demand within the time limited by the court shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to trial by jury. Upon such demand, the court shall order a jury trial of any issues of fact which are required to be tried by jury.
Id.; see Lane v. Mercury Record Corp., 252 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1015 (1st Dep't 1964)
(finding that CPLR 4103 dispels need to "perpetuat[e] the technicalities of pleading
rules found in the decisions spawned by Jackson v. Strong"), affd, 223 N.E.2d 35
(N.Y. 1966); see also SIEGEL, supra note 34, § 209 (discussing effect of CPLR 209 on
right to jury trial). Compare Doherty v. Aaron Mach. Co., 238 N.Y.S.2d 179, 180 (2d
Dep't 1963) (reversing trial court's award of specific performance but affirming alternative judgment for money damages in non-jury case) with Newman v. Resnick,
238 N.Y.S.2d 119, 123 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963) (denying specific performance
after non-jury trial established right to legal damages, but granting plaintiffs leave
to amend claim for legal remedy).
' See supra notes 108 and 110.
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not the jury, would have made the findings of fact. Since both
sides moved for a directed verdict, they thereby consented to
have the judge make any necessary findings of fact;' and he
made them in the plaintiffs favor. The conclusion on appeal
that the reformation could not be considered because of the conceptual difference between estoppel at law and reformation in
equity exalted the illusion of form over form itself.'24
In addition, the Kwiatkowski case pushed Jackson v. Strong
one step further. In the hypothetical modeled on Steinbach v.
Relief Fire Ins. Co., 2 ' the trial court excluded critical evidence offered by the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff would be alerted in a
timely fashion to the necessity of amending his complaint to seek
reformation or, if amendments were precluded under Jackson v.
Strong, at least to seek leave to discontinue without prejudice to
'2

See McCormack v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 N.E. 74, 76 (N.Y. 1917)

(stating that motion by both sides for directed verdict implies consent to judge determining issues); accord Smith v. Weston, 54 N.E. 38, 39 (N.Y. 1899); Daly v. Wise,
30 N.E. 837, 838 (N.Y. 1892); Dillon v. Cockcroft, 90 N.Y. 649, 650-51 (1882); McCall
v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 66 N.Y. 505, 517 (1876); Leggett v. Hyde, 58 N.Y. 272, 275
(1874).
By an amendment to Civil Practice Act section 457-a in 1940, the rule changed
and a motion for a directed verdict no longer waived the right to trial by jury. See
N.Y. CPLR 4401 (McKinney 1992) ("Any party may move for judgment .... The motion does not waive the right to trial by jury ...
."); see also In re La Manna, 259
N.Y.S.2d 987, 988 (4th Dep't 1965) ("Even though both sides moved for directed
verdict, this did not waive right to trial by jury ....
");McTiernan v. Little Falls, 130
N.Y.S.2d 214, 215 (4th Dep't 1954) (stating that defendant could have reserved or
requested right to jury trial).
124 Over fifty years earlier, the New York Court of Appeals had
a similar situation in which a plaintiff in a jury trial sought to avoid the effect of a warranty on the
theory of estoppel and recovered judgment against the defendant insurer. That
judgment was reversed by the General Term. McCall v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Jones
& Spen. 330, 338 (1875), rev'd, 66 N.Y. 505 (1876). On further appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the General Term and the plaintiffs' judgment was reinstated.
McCall , 66 N.Y. at 517 (1876). The court held that the facts pleaded and proved
justified reformation by striking out the warranty, and that since the defendant had
moved for a directed verdict, it was proper for the trial court to find the necessary
facts. Id.; see also Meyer v. Lathrop, 73 N.Y. 315, 320-22 (1878) (applying reformation theory on appeal to uphold finding of referee who accepted parol evidence on
erroneous interpretation theory).
The only legitimate concern underlying Jackson v. Strong was that a defendant's right to trial by jury on a legal claim not be bypassed. Kwiatkowski was the
reverse of Jackson; the legal claim failed at trial and the proof disclosed an equitable claim. If, although doubtful, the significance of the facts might have been different under a reformation analysis than under an estoppel analysis, the New York
Court of Appeals need not have affirmed, as it did in McCall and Meyer, but it could
have remanded for a new trial.
See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
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a new action.'26 In Kwiatkowski, the trial court admitted the
evidence and the plaintiff obtained judgment in her favor. All
seemed well. It was not until her judgment was reversed in the
New York Court of Appeals that she learned of her procedural
misstep. When this happened in Jackson v. Strong, the Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment and granted a new trial. The ultimate insult to Ms. Kwiatkowski lay in the court's final disposition of her action-complaint dismissed.'27
" See Arthur v. Homestead Fire Ins. Co., 78 N.Y. 462, 466-67 (1879) (noting
that lower court gave plaintiff leave to amend complaint), modified, 79 N.Y. 640
(1879); Newman v. Resnick, 238 N.Y.S.2d 119, 123 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963)
(granting plaintiff leave to serve amended complaint for legal relief).
"2 This holding, under a supposedly merged system, was less liberal than contemporary federal cases under a system in which law and equity were formally
separated. In a case similar to Kwiatkowski, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the district court that, without reformation of an insurance policy, the
plaintiff had no cause of action at law. However, the case was remanded to the equity side of the court because, as the court stated, the litigant should not be denied
relief "to which upon his pleadings and proofs he is entitled, merely because his
counsel have come in by the wrong door of the Court." Clarksburg Trust Co. v.
Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 40 F.2d 626, 634 (4th Cir. 1930). A simple affirmance of
the district court's judgment for the defendant would have finished the plaintiff because the short period of limitations written into the policy had expired. Cf Arthur,
78 N.Y. at 467-70 (stating that plaintiffs cause of action that demanded equitable
relief was unnecessary after legal cause of action).
In New York, then as now, a court had authority to grant a new trial when
"necessary and proper." N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 584 (1921) (stating that "the appelrender judgment...
late division of the supreme court, or appellate term, ... shall ...
except where it may be necessary or proper to grant a new trial."); Gerbig v.
Zumpano, 165 N.E.2d 178, 181 (N.Y. 1960) (reversing judgment and granting new
trial). Under N.Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT §§ 23 (1921), it was not necessary to dismiss
and a judgment therein is
Kwiatkowski's complaint. "Ifan action is commenced ...
the plaintiff ... may commence a
reversed on appeal without awarding a new trial ...
new action for the same cause ...." N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 23 (1921); see also Walrath v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 110 N.E. 426, 427-28 (N.Y. 1915) (reversing judgment
for plaintiff on written contract but granting new trial on possible claim on oral contract); Ripley v. Aetra Ins. Co., 30 N.Y. 136, 164-65 (1864) (reversing judgment
based on written contract but recognizing possible reformation claim and granting
new trial). Cf New York Ice Co. v. North W. Ins. Co., 23 N.Y. 357, 359-60 (1861)
(stating that it was error to dismiss legal claim on contract where reformation claim
was not established at trial).
To be distinguished are cases where the New York Court of Appeals dismissed
a complaint after reversing a plaintiffs judgment because it was clear that no viable
alternative existed. Model Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Reeves, 140 N.E. 715, 718 (N.Y.
1923) (reversing money judgment erroneously granted on equitable claim; finding
that facts disclosed purely legal claim for money had and received; and dismissing
complaint because such action was barred by statute of limitations); accord Saperstein v. Mechanics' & Farmers' Sav. Bank, 126 N.E. 708, 710 (N.Y. 1920) (finding
that plaintiff was not entitled to either legal or equitable relief and reversing judgment); Whalen v. Stuart, 87 N.E. 819, 822 (N.Y. 1909) (reversing judgment and

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:539

As stated earlier, under Steinbach, the final judgment in
Kwiatkowski's action on the contract precluded her from starting
a new action to recover the same proceeds on a different theory.
One can only speculate whether the New York Court of Appeals
had this case in mind when it finally dismissed her complaint.
Given the cases on the books at the time, it would have required
great prescience on the part of her lawyer to have anticipated the
cul-de-sac into which the case was eventually steered. Indeed,
once the trial court admitted the evidence contradicting the written warranty, the plaintiffs fate was out of her lawyer's hands;
the favorable verdict and the appellate process inexorably led to
a final dismissal of the complaint.
Readers will have to decide for themselves whether the law
should have allowed Kwiatkowski another chance at having her
evidence heard in a reformation action. Many will say too bad,
there are hundreds of bungled cases where the lawyers or the
courts or both get it wrong the first time; that is not a reason to
allow a second action on the same claim; finality means finality,
right or wrong. For this writer, the case seems sufficiently
analogous to the Steinbach and Northern Assurance cases relied
on by the Law Revision Commission, in which claim preclusion
was deemed inappropriate because the claim presented in the
second action never had a fair chance of being heard in the first
one. This is not to applaud the statute adopted on the Commission's recommendation. In the first place, the statute is overbroad in relation to its legitimate rationale as applied to plaintiffs while ignoring the same issue in relation to defendants.'28
In the second place, any legitimate cases (now necessarily rare)
in which a second action is justified can be better accommodated
within the claim preclusion doctrine as flexibly developed in the
case law." 9

dismissing plaintiffs complaint).
128 See supra text accompanying notes 81-86.
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 25, cmt. h., illus. 15 (1982) sug-

gests that road blocks erroneously placed on a plaintiffs ability to present a new
theory of recovery are correctable on appeal and should not diminish the preclusory
effect of a resulting final judgment. Id. The comments do not address the problem of
road blocks imposed by the court of last resort. Section 26(1)(c), comment (c), states
that where "formal barriers" operated to deprive a plaintiff of a meaningful opportunity to obtain relief theoretically applicable to the facts of the case, "it is unfair to
preclude him from a second action in which he can present those phases of the claim
which he was disabled from presenting in the first." Id. § 26(1)(c), cmt. c.
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CONCLUSION

The predecessor of section 3002(d) of the CPLR was
anomalous when it was enacted in 1939. Not only was it incompatible with claim preclusion theory as it stood at the time, but
the legitimate difficulty identified in the Steinbach and Northern
Assurance cases had largely become obsolete through federal
court reform. Even with reference to election of remedies, the
statute was an unnecessary attempt to solve a nonexistent
problem. 3 '
Developments in claim preclusion doctrine since the statute's enactment only accentuate its regressive character. Facts
relevant to the meaning of a written contract and facts supporting reformation of the contract certainly arise from the same
transaction when applied to the same performance obligation.'31
If the Restatement of Judgments and recent New York Court of
Appeals cases are good law, the statute is bad law and deserves
repeal.

"' It has long been held in New York that mere commencement of an action on
a written contract, without a final judgment on the merits, is not a conclusive election of remedy barring a later action to reform the contract and recover on it as reformed. Baird v. Erie R.R., 104 N.E. 614, 616 (N.Y. 1914); Arthur, 78 N.Y. at 466-70
(1879) (decided same year as Steinbach).
In both Baird and Arthur, the plaintiffs in their earlier actions suffered nonsuits, and no case was submitted to the juries for verdicts. Such a disposition was
not then considered a final judgment on the merits and did not operate to preclude a
later action on the same claim. 2 FREEMAN, supra note 16, §§ 724, 755. Similar to
the effect of a successful demurrer to a complaint, a nonsuit was only conclusive as
to the insufficiency of the same evidence when presented in support of the same
theory in a second trial. Id. Modem practice is substantially different. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(b), cmt. f.-g. (explaining effects of voluntary and compulsory nonsuits); see also SIEGEL, supra note 34, §§ 297-98 (discussing
discontinuance of action by plaintiff).
In Steinbach, the plaintiff in the New York action had previously been defeated
in a Maryland federal action, which had gone to final judgment based on a jury verdict. Steinbach v. Relief Fire Ins. Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 183 (1871).Not only did the
Report of The New York Law Revision Commission, supra note 1, fail to analyze the
peculiar circumstances arising from the limited subject matter jurisdiction of the
pre-merger federal court system, but it apparently failed to appreciate the difference then existing between a nonsuit and a final judgment.
'31 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25, illus. 20 (1982) (illustrating
situation where plaintiff who brings legal action for money damages and later sues
in equity to reform contract will present evidence of parties' intentions in both
cases).

